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Abstract 
The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is estimated using dynamic panel estimation on a 
sample covering 112 emerging countries for the period 1980-2014.  The results show that income inequality has a 
positive influence on economic growth for richer countries, in line with the classic theory, and a negative effect for 
poorer countries, as argued by the political economy approach.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The income inequality-economic growth relationship has been widely analysed in the literature. However, no 
consensus regarding the effect of inequality on growth has yet been reached. The theoretical literature presents two 
main approaches. The classic theory postulates a positive association between inequality and growth through the 
saving rate (Stiglitz, 1969). The political economy approach holds that inequality harms economic growth through 
social instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996) and credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Both 
approaches find empirical support (Delbianco et al., 2014; Lee and Son, 2016; and references therein). An increasing 
empirical literature shows that the inequality-growth relationship can be either positive or negative, depending on 
the different scenarios considered or on the properties of the distribution of income (Voitchovsky, 2005;  Delbianco 
et al., 2014; and Lee and Son, 2016). 
The hypothesis in this paper is that the effects of inequality on growth depend on the stage of development of each 
economy. Thus, at early stages, the effects are negative because the political economy approach holds. At higher 
stages they are positive since the classic theory prevails. We assume that, in highly developed countries, the needs 
of lower-income people are less pressing, and therefore higher inequality does not cause as much social unrest as it 
could generate in less developed economies, but that it favours greater savings and investment by the rich 
population, which in turn fosters economic growth.  
To test our hypothesis, we divide the sample according to the level of income, the degree of income inequality, 
monetisation as a proxy of credit constraints, political stability, and the level of savings. For each subsample we 
analyse the inequality-economic growth relationship. Section 2 presents the data and the variables. In Section 3 the 
model specification and empirical results are shown. 
2. Data and variables 
Our sample covers 112 emerging countries during the period 1980-2014. All data were obtained from the World 
Bank. To overcome the unbalanced panel, the data is transformed into a five-year average. The explained variable is 
growth rate (GROWTH) of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We use the Gini coefficient (GINI) as an indicator of 
income inequality. As a proxy of credit constraint, we use the degree of monetisation measured by the percentage of 
the monetary aggregate M2 over the GDP (M2). For political stability (PS), we use the Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence Indicator. Savings serve as a proxy for investment. 
The control variables are those found as robust by Levine and Renelt (1992): the investment/GDP ratio (INV), 
education (HK) measured  as  the average number of years of total schooling (15 years or more), openness measured 
as the sum of exports plus imports to GDP (OPEN) and population growth (POP) (Summary Statistics in Appendix). 
 Table 1. Mean of Initial Income 
 
HIGH LOW 
INITIAL INCOME 5558.99 680.49 
Income Equality 3763.84 2878.20 
M2 5836.48 4164.67 
Political Stability 3580.30 1953.54 
INV 3666.009 2410.4 
Note: High:  those countries with values above the median. Low: those 
below the median  
 
3. Methodology and results 
To test our hypothesis, for each subsample in Table 1 we estimate: 
 
where is the log of GDP of country i in period t, and  Xi,t denotes the set of control variables (current or lagged. 
Our variable of interest is the Gini coefficient, lagged one period. Finally,   is the error term and α, β and δ are the 
set of parameters to be estimated. The temporal unit is the mean quinquennial observations, starting in 1980-1984. 
The lagged HK and GINI coefficients are included because their impact on the real economy may take longer than 
five years to take effect (Voitchovstky, 2005).  
To estimate the above expression, the Arellano-Bond specification (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2015) is 
used. Lagged variables and quinquennial dummies were used as instruments. The results appear in Table 2. 
 Table 2. Dynamic Panel results 
  Initial Income Income Equality M2 Political Stability INV 
Dependent 
Variable: 
GROWTH 
Total HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
          
  
GROWTH (-1) 0.08 -0.10 -0.06 0.03 -0.33** -0.24* -0.34 -0.06 -0.25 -0.04 -0.12 
 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.14) (0.24) (0.12) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) 
GINI(-1) 0.26 0.56** 0.16 0.48** 0.03 -0.08 -0.14 0.70*** -0.25** 0.05 0.17 
 
(0.16) (0.26) (0.13) (0.19) (0.14) (0.11) (0.29) (0.23) (0.12) (0.10) (0.19) 
INV 0.24** 0.37** 0.03 0.12 0.39*** 0.29*** -0.47 0.25** 0.08 0.10 0.40* 
 
(0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.35) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.21) 
HK(-1) -0.45 0.81** 0.57 0.82 0.41 -0.39 4.87* 0.92 1.10** 0.18 2.18** 
 
(0.40) (0.39) (0.73) (0.55) (0.39) (0.32) (2.65) (0.76) (0.52) (0.31) (0.96) 
POB -1.52 -0.47 0.51 0.03 -0.67 -2.62*** 8.26** -1.90 -1.15 -1.06 5.66* 
 
(0.95) (1.21) (1.50) (0.80) (1.99) (0.57) (4.05) (1.67) (1.38) (0.83) (3.31) 
OPEN 0.06* -0.04 0.06** 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.17** -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.21*** 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) 
          
  
Observations 185 107 78 80 105 135 50 100 85 105 80 
Countries 70 38 32 35 49 59 29 49 34 51 40 
Hansen Overid 
(p-value) 
0.253 0.458 0.641 0.543 0.591 0.550 0.896 0.581 0.542 0.560 0.651 
Hansen 
Excluding 
Group 
(p-value) 
0.299 0.336 0.631 0.366 0.474 0.508 0.852 0.533 0.418 0.693 0.538 
Hansen 
Exogenous 
 (p-value) 
0.260 0.778 0.469 0.880 0.755 0.521 0.703 0.542 0.760 0.187 0.724 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Hansen test does not reject the hypothesis of no over-identification and exogeneity of the instruments, thereby validating the results 
obtained. 
 
Columns (2) and (3) show that income inequality is positive and significant only for richer countries, as stated by the 
classic theory. These results hold when the subsample is divided in terms of income equality and political stability. 
For income equality, columns (4) and (5) show that GINI is significant for those countries with higher income 
equality, which could indicate the existence of a threshold beyond which inequality encourages growth. For PS, 
columns (8) and (9) show that income inequality is positive and significant for stable (richer) countries, and negative 
and significant for less stable (poorer) countries, as argued by the political economy approach. When the sample is 
divided in terms of M2 and INV, income inequality is not significant.  
These results support our hypothesis of a positive inequality-growth relationship for richer countries, in accordance 
with the classic theory, and of a negative relationship for countries with lower income (i.e. politically unstable 
countries), as predicted by the political economy approach.  
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APPENDIX  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Economic Growth 710 1.71 4.34 -30.26 33.50 
Initial Income 770 3120 4879 143 36069 
Gini 425 40.37 9.95 19.40 74.33 
M2 673 38.44 24.73 1.23 185.71 
PI  449 -0.52 0.88 -3.09 1.40 
Investment 679 21.57 8.10 2.53 65.93 
HK  616 5.44 3.08 0.05 13.16 
POP 787 1.88 1.40 -4.64 14.93 
OPEN 693 74.58 38.19 0.67 310.58 
 
